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I. INTRODUCTION
The preemption provision of The Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)' is "virtually unique."'2 The
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1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 [hereinafter cited by session law sections of ERISA and United States Code Anno-
tated sections]. ERISA is a comprehensive regulatory statute that Congress enacted to cor-
rect abuses in the area of private employee benefit plans. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension
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breadth of the statute's language' and the legislative history4
clearly evidence a congressional design to occupy the field of pri-
vate employee benefit plan regulation.5 Notwithstanding this spe-
cific design, the question of whether a state law impinges on fed-
eral superintendence often is difficult to resolve. The difficulty
occurs largely because employee benefit plans do not exist in a vac-
uum. State regulation in other fields, for example, laws respecting
health care, domestic relations, employment discrimination, securi-
ties transactions, and taxation, may touch upon employee benefit
plans in a variety of ways.
Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 362 (1980) (Title IV of ERISA intended as a means of
protecting interests of employees and their beneficiaries). The statute, inter alia, imposes
participation, vesting, accrual, and funding requirements on pension plans. ERISA §§ 201-
306, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1086 (West 1985). It also establishes rules concerning reporting,
disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility for both pension and welfare plans and provides
remedies, sanctions, and access to the federal courts if a fiduciary or plan administrator
breaches those rules. ERISA §§ 101-111, 401-414, 502, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114,
1132 (West 1985). If ERISA preempts a state law, it is void under the supremacy clause. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
2. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26
(1983).
3. Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985), provides generally for
the preemption of "any and all State laws" that "relate to any employee benefit plan." See
infra text accompanying notes 29-30.
4. See S. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974) (conference report on ERISA);
120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent); id. 29,933 (statement of Sen. Wil-
liams); id. 29,942 (statement of Sen. Javits).
5. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-99 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhat-
tan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); see also Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d
323 (2d Cir. 1982); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980); Hew-
lett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Wad-
sworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
Despite the perception by some commentators that Supreme Court doctrine regarding
preemption is in a state of disarray, see, e.g., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); Note, A
Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978), many scholars view a court's
finding that federal law occupies a given field as one of the "two most commonly-used stan-
dards" to determine preemption. See Turza & Halloway, Preemption of State Laws Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 163, 175 (1979);
see also Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 526-33.
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (1978). Once courts make
such a finding, they analyze preemption questions by focusing on the outer scope of the
federal law and examining whether the state regulation falls within its boundaries. Turza &
Halloway, supra, at 373. Courts generally employ this analysis to determine preemption
questions under ERISA.
6. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); Farmer v. United
Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 298 (1977) (most difficult preemption questions
arise when state and federal laws are aimed at different subject matters, but application of
state law touches upon congressional desire to create uniform federal regulatory scheme).
The problem is complicated by the disparity of regulation between pension and welfare
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Although the Supreme Court has stated that the reach of
ERISA's preemption provision is wide, it has not demarcated a
clear boundary.7 The Court's guidelines are metaphorical rather
than functional," and lower courts now are grappling with an on-
slaught of ERISA preemption challenges to state regulation in
fields other than employee benefits. One such preemption question
is the validity of state legislation regulating third party prescrip-
tion drug programs.
Third party prescription drug programs, as their name indi-
cates, involve the payment for prescription drugs by a party other
than the patient-purchaserY The programs are implemented by
agreements between the service provider (a pharmacy) and the
third party payor.10 The extent of these programs has increased
plans. ERISA imposes minimum regulatory standards on many basic terms and conditions
of pension plans, but with respect to welfare plans it imposes only reporting and disclosure
obligations and rigid duties upon fiduciaries. See supra note 1. Thus, much of the state
regulation that affects welfare plans does not impinge upon specific subject matters regu-
lated by ERISA. See Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation
Under ERISA, 62 IowA L. REv. 57 (1976) (arguing that ERISA creates a vacuum with re-
spect to regulation of welfare plans, and preemption rules should be amended to allow states
to fill the vacuum).
7. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
8. See id. at 100 n.21.
9. The concept of third party prescription drug programs originated in 1967 as an
outgrowth of the collective bargaining agreement reached that year between the United
Auto Workers and Ford Motor Company. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Peacock's
Apothecary, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (discussing history of third party pre-
scription drug programs). Ford agreed to provide prescription drug benefits to its employees
and contracted with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross of Michigan) to
insure the cost of the benefits. Id. at 1262. Blue Cross of Michigan entered into agreements
with various pharmacies in the state, in which the pharmacies agreed to provide prescription
drugs to eligible Ford employees. Blue Cross of Michigan in return would reimburse the
pharmacies based on their acquisition costs plus a dispensing fee. Id. Additionally, Blue
Cross of Michigan contracted with local Blue Cross organizations in other states to enter
into similar pharmacy agreements to provide prescription drug benefits to eligible Ford
workers outside of Michigan. This arrangement continues today. Id.
10. In the typical case, the agreement is entered into between a pharmacist and either
an insurance company or local Blue Cross/Blue Shield organization acting as the third party
payor. The third party payor insures the consumer against liability for the cost of
pharmaceuticals. An employer (or employee welfare plan) pays the third party the cost of
insurance premiums, and the third party pays the participating pharmacists pursuant to the
provider agreement. In most other instances the agreement is executed by pharmacists and
a claims administrator. The claims administrator, in turn, has contracted with an employer
or employee welfare plan that has itself insured the cost of pharmaceuticals for the plan's
participants. The employer pays the claims administrator a service fee and the cost of
claims, and the claims administrator reimburses the participating pharmacists pursuant to
the agreement. See Problems on Third Party Prepaid Prescription Programs: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House
Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 54-57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
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since their introduction in 1967. These agreements, however, have
long been unprofitable to pharmacists, particularly to independent
retail pharmacists. Typically, third party prescription drug agree-
ments reimburse the participating pharmacist for his acquisition
costs, plus a fixed dispensing fee; they do not reimburse the pro-
vider based on his usual and customary charges.1 For the indepen-
dent pharmacist, the fixed fee often barely covers the costs of fill-
ing a prescription. 2
The ability of third party payors to impose uneconomical
terms on independent pharmacies results from two factors: first,
the economic power of the group purchasers (usually large insur-
ance carriers), combined with their natural desire to reduce costs;
and second, the weak bargaining power of independent pharma-
cists, who are precluded by the antitrust laws from joining together
to bargain collectively. 13 As a result, the independent pharmacist
confronts the business dilemma of either acceding to an unprofita-
ble third party agreement or losing a significant amount of new
and existing patronage.
Independent pharmacists who enter third party payor agree-
ments often attempt to negate the resulting economic loss by
charging higher prices to uninsured patient-purchasers. The bur-
den falls most heavily upon uninsured patient-purchasers who do
Hearings].
11. If, however, a pharmacist's usual and customary charge for a particular prescrip-
tion is lower than the acquisition cost plus fixed dispensing fee, many programs limit the
pharmacist's reimbursement to his usual and customary charge. This provision is modeled
after Medicaid provisions concerning pharmaceutical reimbursement. See 42 C.F.R. §
447.331-.334 (1984). It also is not uncommon for agreements to require a fixed copayment by
the consumer, for example one or two dollars per drug. The copayment, in turn, is deducted
from the reimbursement fee otherwise paid by the insurer. See generally Hearings, supra
note 10, at 54-57.
12. For example, a study by the Michigan Pharmacists Association (MPhA) found
that in 1981 Michigan pharmacies absorbed $21.8 million in lost profits as a consequence of
insufficient third party reimbursement fees, an average of $10,198 per pharmacy. WEEKLY
PHARMACY REP., June 28, 1982, at 1, 4 (THE GREEN SHEET, published by F-D-C Reports)
[hereinafter cited as THE GREEN SHEET]. The magnitude of this loss is starkly revealed by
the fact that the average net profit of community pharmacies in Michigan in 1981 was
$13,973. See Eli Lilly and Company, Lilly Digest, at 5 Table 1 (1982). Since the advent of
third party prescription drug programs, the average net profit of independent pharmacies
has decreased steadily from 5.8% in 1965 to 3.2% in 1981. Fixed Fee Pegged As Cause for
Declining Profits, NARD J., Aug. 1983, at 14.
13. See, e.g., Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (9th
Cir.) (concerted activity by pharmacists to affect prices violates prohibition against horizon-
tal price fixing under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962);
United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah) (same), aff'd per
curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
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not have insurance coverage, including the non-Medicaid poor.
Rather than reduce consumer drug prices generally, third party
programs shift costs to the uninsured public."' To the extent these
programs are uneconomical to independent pharmacists, they have
contributed to a reduction in the number of independent pharma-
cies. Because pharmacies, particularly in rural or lower income ar-
eas, often provide the only readily accessible source of health care
counseling,'5 this result has substantial adverse societal impacts. 16
14. For example, a 1984 study in Indiana estimated that although third party payor
reimbursement fees were below the average total costs per prescription for 82% of the
state's pharmacies, pharmacists would continue to participate in these inequitable third
party payor programs as long as reimbursement levels were sufficient to cover variable costs
per prescription. To cover average total costs, therefore, they must shift a disproportionate
amount of the fixed costs per prescription to their uninsured customers. Jacobs, The Ade-
quacy of Third-Party Payments for Prescriptions, CURRENT CONCEPTS IN RETAIL PHARMACY
MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 8, 12-13; see also R. DeNuzzo, 29 Albany College of Pharmacy
Prescription Survey 17 (Mar. 15, 1985) (published by MED. ADVERTISING NEws). The Albany
College Survey of 15,416 prescriptions filled in 1984 estimated that, on the average, pharma-
cists charged uninsured, cash-paying customers a dispensing fee (difference between the
pharmacist's acquisition costs and the consumer's price for a prescription) that is $0.43
higher per prescription than the dispensing fees they charge for prescriptions filled under
third party payor agreements. The average dispensing fee for cash-paying customers was
$3.83 while that for beneficiaries of third party payor programs was $3.40.
15. See, e.g., Statement of Mr. John A. Johnson Before the U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services Task Force on Reimbursement for Prescription Drugs, NARD J., Oct.
1983, at 19-20 (retail pharmacists frequently represent sole source of medical advice in lo-
cales with high degree of Medicaid utilization). Independent pharmacists dispense nearly
90V of all Medicaid prescriptions, thereby evidencing the extent of their involvement in
providing health services to residents of low income areas. Medicaid Survey Results, NARD
J., Sept. 1983, at 14. Furthermore, retail pharmacies are geographically well distributed.
Only 44 of the nation's 3,093 counties lack retail pharmacies. California Pharmacists Ass'n,
Michigan Pharmacists Ass'n & Texas Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Dollars and Sense of Pharmacy
Services 6 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Dollars and Sense]. By contrast, the Department of
Health and Human Services projected that in 1982, 761 rural counties would have a ratio of
population to primary care physicians of greater than 3500 to 1. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, DIFFUSION AND THE CHANGING GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIUTON OF PRIMARY CARE
PHYSICIANS 51, Table 2 (1983). The Department of Health and Human Services has desig-
nated these rural counties as "Health Care Manpower Shortage Areas." See id. at 17 Table
2. Furthermore, the ratio of population to primary care physicians is five times as great in
counties with a population of 10,000 or less as it is in counties with a population of greater
than 1,000,000. See id.
16. In addition to cost shifting, see supra note 14, inadequate third party program
fixed fees may contribute to the pressure on pharmacists to reduce acquisition costs. This
pressure has contributed to the existence of a drug diversion market. Drug diversion injects
into the marketplace pharmaceuticals that do not comply with federal quality control stan-
dards. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT
ON DRUG DIVERSION (Comm. Print 1985). In a common diversion scheme drugstore chains
purchase, at reduced wholesale prices, pharmaceuticals that are intended specifically for ex-
portation and therefore are not manufactured in accordance with federal standards. See id.
at 6-21. As a result, consumers unknowingly purchase unlabeled, misbranded, expired, or
counterfeit drugs. See id. at 1-2.
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Currently, six states have laws that seek to alleviate the ad-
verse societal effects of third party prescription drug programs. 17
Bills that are modeled after those laws also have been introduced
in several other states.'8 A seventh state, Alabama, enacted similar
legislation in 1981,1" but the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama held that ERISA preempted the
statute.20 A challenge to the Georgia statute presently is pending in
federal court.21
This Article analyzes the preemptive effect of ERISA on state
third party prescription drug program legislation. It argues that
such laws do not "relate to employee benefit plans" and that even
if the courts were to view them as relating to employee benefit
plans, the laws meet the statutory exception to preemption for
state laws that "regulate . . . insurance. '22
17. See Third Party Prescription Programs Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174o
(West Supp. 1985); Third Party Prescription Program Law of 1983, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 79A-
1201 to -1209 (Harrison 1984); Third Party Prescription Program Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
§§ 1065.59-1 to .59-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Third Party Prescription Program Act, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 2931-2937 (Supp. 1985-1986); Third Party Prescription Act, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 781-789 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Third Party Prescription Program
Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-10-301 to -309 (1982). These laws primarily regulate third party
prescription drug programs in three ways. First, Georgia, Oklahoma, and Tennessee require
that third party prescription drug agreements not establish reimbursement rates that are
less than the prevailing rates paid by ordinary consumers for the same services. Second,
they all require that every agreement include a formal payment schedule and precise rules
on the cancellation of coverage to beneficiaries of the program. Third, they prohibit admin-
istrators of third party prescription drug programs to deny payment to any pharmacy for
pharmaceutical services rendered because of the fraudulent use of prescription program
identification cards.
18. The initial success in obtaining third party prescription drug program legislation
led state pharmaceutical associations to pursue similar legislation in thirty-one states.
Abood, Litigation on Third Party Prescription Programs: An Update, LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE, Apr. 1985, at 75, 78. In recent years the issue has enjoyed high visibility and substan-
tial legislative attention. Pending a decision in the challenge to Georgia's Third Party Pre-
scription Law, see infra note 21, however, state pharmaceutical organizations are increas-
ingly reluctant to lobby for such regulation due to the current uncertainty about its
constitutionality. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION EXEC-
uTivEs, NCSPAE REPORT ON THIRD PARTY PRESCRIPTION PROGRAMS: 1984-85 UPDATE 13
(Texas Pharmaceutical Association had originally decided to pursue a third party prescrip-
tion program bill in the 1984-85 legislative session but eventually changed its plans; Indiana
Pharmacists Association lobbied for a 1984 bill entitled "The Third Party Pharmaceutical
Goods Reimbursement Act," but this bill was tabled).
19. Third Party Prescription Program Act, ALA. CODE §§ 34-23-110 to -118 (Supp.
1985).
20. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D.
Ala. 1983); see infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
21. General Motors Corp. v. Caldwell, No. C84-331A (N.D. Ga. filed Feb. 21, 1984).
22. Section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (West 1985), excepts
from the general preemption rule any state law "which regulates insurance, banking, or se-
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The Article contends that third party prescription drug pro-
gram statutes represent a type of "borderline 2 3 preemption prob-
lem, and it offers a functional approach to resolve the problem. If a
state law affects employee benefit plans without infringing on their
terms and conditions, a court should balance the state's interest in
the regulation against the extent of the legislation's effect on em-
ployee benefit plans. Third party prescription drug program legis-
lation serves important state interests in promoting the health and
welfare of its citizenry and has an insignificant economic and ad-
ministrative effect on employee benefit plans. Therefore, such reg-
ulation should not be preempted.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has adopted a literal, plain
meaning construction of ERISA's insurance saving clause.24 As a
result, to the extent third party prescription drug program legisla-
tion regulates pharmacy agreements executed by insurance compa-
nies that have assumed the risk of funding drug benefits, the insur-
ance exception saves such laws from preemption. The Article
concludes that Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothe-
cary, Inc.,25 the only case thus far to address this preemption issue,
is plainly wrong and poorly reasoned.
The importance of the preemption issue extends beyond state
efforts concerning third party prescription drug programs. The
precipitous rise in health care costs during the last twenty years2 6
has kindled the concern of state legislators. 7 State governments
curities." See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
23. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
24. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
25. Peacock's Apothecary, 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
26. Health care expenses for the nation more than tripled from 1972 to 1983, rising
from $94 billion to $355 billion. Connecticut Hospital Ass'n, Hospital Costs and Govern-
ment Regulation: The Connecticut Experience 1 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Connecti-
cut Hospital Ass'n]. Between 1965 and 1983 health care expenditures as a share of the gross
national product rose from 6.0% to 10.9%. HEALTH INs. ASS'N OF AM., 1982-83 SOURCE BOOK
OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA Table 5.2 (1984 update). Concomitant with this increase has
been the increased role of third party payors. By 1982 private third parties paid 29% of
America's total health care bill, compared with 28% by patients. Governmental programs
accounted for the remaining 43%. Health Care Spending Hits a New High, NARD J., Sept.
1983, at 14, 98.
27. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the states
have responded to increased health care spending by developing 800 different cost contain-
ment regulations. See Connecticut Hospital Ass'n, supra note 26. One commentator predicts
that states soon will enact legislation that will require health care providers to collect, re-
port, and disclose usage and cost information. Such statutes would be designed to aid busi-
nesses and insurers in analyzing provider efficiency and in developing cost containment
strategies. Pierce, Health Insurance on the Statehouse Floor: 1985 Projections, 59 Hospi-
TALS, Feb. 1, 1985, at 57, 58.
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increasingly are attempting to reduce health care costs without
sacrificing the quality of health care services to the public as a
whole.28 The consequence of this effort is an increase in regulation
of the relationship between third party payors and other health
care providers. The analysis and conclusions in this Article provide
a framework for determining the effect of ERISA on these regula-
tory efforts and, more broadly, shed light on the role that ERISA
leaves to the states in the health care cost area.
II. ERISA's PREEMPTION SCHEME
Several provisions of ERISA directly address the preemption
question. Section 514(a) states the general rule that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws[2 9§ insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any [covered] employee benefit plan."30 Section
28. State governments face a difficult task in attempting to resolve the tension be-
tween the cost and quality of health care. One major complication is that technological ad-
vances made in health care since the mid-1960's have been responsible for both a significant
improvement in the quality of health service and a rapid escalation in health care costs.
New biomedical technology developed in the past 20 years includes CT scanners, surgical
lasers, and auto-analyzers. New medical procedures include organ transplants and renal di-
alysis. Extraordinary health care costs have been incurred in operating and maintaining
these diagnostic and treatment techniques. The chart below shows capital equipment ex-
penditures of three new technologies:
CT Scanners $600,000 - $800,000
Surgical Lasers $ 80,000 - $100,000
Auto-analyzers $100,000 - $200,000
Connecticut Hospital Ass'n, supra note 26, at 7.
Of equal note, however, is the improvement in health care quality that these innova-
tions have precipitated. Many lives have been lengthened or improved as a consequence of
new medical services. In at least one state the citizens perceive the benefits of new medical
treatments as outweighing the costs. The Connecticut Hospital Association in the spring of
1983 conducted a statewide survey and discovered that 60% of respondents favored the use
of new technologies in hospitals; approximately the same percentage thought that the re-
sulting increased costs should be spread among charges to all patients. Id.
The rise in pharmaceutical prices and the advent of third party pharmaceutical pro-
grams similarly creates a tension between cost containment efforts and the desirability of a
widespread distribution of pharmacy services. State regulation of third party prescription
drug programs attempts to resolve this tension in favor of an equitable pricing system that
assures the balanced distribution of pharmacy services.
29. Under ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(c)(1) (West 1985), "[tlhe term 'State
law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations or other State action having the effect of
law." The term "State" is defined as "a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the
terms and conditions of employee benefit plans." ERISA § 514(c)(2) 29 U.S.C.A. §
1144(c)(2) (West 1985).
30. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 1985). Employee benefit plans include both welfare
plans and pension plans. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(3) (West 1985). ERISA, however,
does not cover employee benefit plans that are established or maintained by governmental
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514(b)(2)(A),31 however, enumerates three exceptions to this rule.
It provides that "nothing in this title shall be construed to ...
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insur-
ance, banking or securities." 2 But section 514(b)(2)(B) itself limits
entities or by churches; nor does it cover excess benefit plans "maintained solely for the
purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment com-
pensation or disability insurance laws," or plans "maintained outside of the United States
primarily for the benefit of . . .nonresident aliens." ERISA § 4(b)(3)(4), 29 U.S.C.A. §
1003(b)(3)(4) (West 1985); see also id. § 3(32), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(32) (definition of govern-
mental plans); id. § 3(33)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33)(A) (definition of church plans); id. §
3(36), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(36) (definition of excess benefit plans). Section 3(1) of ERISA
defines an employee welfare plan as follows:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that
such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of provid-
ing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or oth-
erwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprentice-
ship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal
services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions
on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (West 1985).
If an employer or employee organization provides prescription drug benefits to employ-
ees, either in conjunction with other medical benefits, or as an independent health care
benefit, that action constitutes the formation of an employee welfare plan.
31. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (West 1985).
32. The exceptions for banking and securities laws clearly would not apply to third
party prescription drug program legislation. ERISA also excepts from the preemption provi-
sion "any generally applicable criminal law of a State." ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.A. §
1144(b)(4) (West 1985). If a third party prescription drug program statute included criminal
penalties, this would not be a sufficient cause for excepting the statute from displacement
by ERISA. Section 514(b)(4) was added to ERISA in conference, as a result of the conferees'
decision to expand the general preemption rule to cover all state laws that "relate to" em-
ployee benefit plans. The conferees did not intend to cover merely those state laws that
conflicted with the subject matters treated by ERISA, as earlier drafts of the legislation had
provided. See infra note 41. Furthermore, the legislative history contains no discussion of
what Congress meant by "generally applicable" criminal laws; this suggests that Congress
intended that the term be given its commonly understood legal meaning. Accordingly, "gen-
erally applicable" criminal laws encompass criminal statutes that are addressed to the citi-
zenry as a whole, such as laws respecting larceny or embezzlement. The term excludes laws
limited to specific entities, such as criminal penalties to punish the conduct of an employee
benefit plan qua plan, health care provider qua provider, or insurer qua insurer. Case law is
consistent with this view. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human
Relations, 599 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); Trustees of
Sheet Metal Workers Fund v. Aberdeen Blower & Sheet Metal Workers, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
561, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Finally, ERISA also provides that it "shall [not] be construed to alter, amend ....
impair, or supersede" any other federal law. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(d) (West
1985). Thus, ERISA would not preempt a federal third party prescription drug program
statute.
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these exceptions." The statute provides that for the purpose of de-
termining if a state law regulates insurance no benefit plan will be
"deemed" to be an insurance company, insurer, or in the business
of insurance.3
4
A preemption challenge under ERISA to third party prescrip-
tion drug program legislation therefore should be analyzed in three
steps. First, does the law "relate to" employee benefit plans and
thus fall within the preemption language of section 514(a)? Sec-
ond, if so, is the law an insurance law for purposes of section
514(b)(2)(A)? Third, if the law is an insurance law, is it one that
"deems" an employee benefit plan to be an insurer, insurance com-
pany, or in the business of insurance?
A. Does State Legislation to Regulate Third Party Prescription
Drug Programs "Relate to" Employee Benefit Plans?
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines35 is the starting point in determining
whether state third party prescription drug program legislation
"relate[s] to" employee benefit plans within the context of section
514(a). 8 In Shaw the Supreme Court construed the phrase in re-
gard to two New York laws; the first law made it illegal to discrimi-
nate in employee benefit plans on the ground of pregnancy,37 and
33. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (West 1985).
34. Section 514(b)(2)(B) reads:
Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for pur-
poses of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (West 1985) (emphasis added).
35. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
36. Prior to Shaw, the court reviewed ERISA's preemption rules in Alessi v. Raybes-
tos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), but it did not construe the meaning of the phrase
"relate to." Alessi concerned the effect of ERISA upon a New Jersey workers' compensation
law that made it illegal for pension plans to offset benefits by the amount of a participant's
workers' compensation award. Prior to ERISA the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) expressly
had approved this offset mechanism, and the Court found that when Congress enacted
ERISA's vesting rules, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1051, it "knew of the IRS rulings" and "essentially
approved the[m]." Alessi, 451 U.S. at 519 & n.15. Thus, the New Jersey statute conflicted
with congressional intent. The Court, therefore, held that the statute "related to" employee
benefit plans and was preempted. It was of no moment to the Court that the intrusion
emanated from a state workers' compensation statute rather than a state statute denomi-
nated as a pension regulation. The Court said that "even indirect state action bearing on
private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern." Id. at 525.
37. See Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41
N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976) (construing N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 290-301
(McKinney 1982)).
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the second law required employers to pay sick leave benefits to em-
ployees who were unable to work because of pregnancy.3 8
The Court unanimously held that the bounds of section
514(a)'s preemptive reach were as broad as the normal sense of the
phrase "relates to.""9 The Court stated that a law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan "in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has
a connection with or reference to such a plan. '40 Moreover, the
Court mined the legislative history of section 514(a) and concluded
that Congress specifically intended to use the words "relate to" in
this broad layman's sense 4 1 and did not intend the section "to pre-
empt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee bene-
fit plans" or laws "dealing with the subject matters covered by
ERISA-reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the
like., 42
Once the Court established that the term "relates to" created
a broad preemptive reach, it had no difficulty assessing the validity
of the laws at issue. The pregnancy discrimination law, by requir-
ing that employee benefit plans treat pregnancies similarly to other
nonoccupational disabilities, and the disability law, by requiring
employers (and thus the employee benefit plans that they spon-
sored) to provide pregnancy disability benefits, affected the struc-
38. N.Y. WoRK ComP. LAW §§ 204-205 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
39, 463 U.S. at 98.
40. Id. at 96-97. In a footnote, the Court quoted from the definition of "relate" in
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979): "[t]o stand in some relation; to have bearing
or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association. . . or connection with." 463 U.S. at
97 n.16.
41. The Court noted that earlier versions of the bill that became ERISA contained a
limited preemption clause that applied only to state laws relating to the specific benefit plan
areas regulated by the statute. For example, the version of ERISA that passed the House
provided that the Act would have superseded state laws "relat[ing] to . . . reporting and
disclosure responsibilities, and fiduciary responsibilities." LR 2, 93d Cong. 2d Sess.
§ 514(a) (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 4057-58 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY]. The Senate version of ERISA spoke in more general but substantively similar terms:
"[t]he provisions of this Act shall supersede any and all laws of the States. . .insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act." H.R. 2, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 699(a) (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 3820. Yet the
conference committee rejected these versions in favor of the present language, and the Court
in Shaw viewed this rejection as an indication that "relates to" should be given its custom-
ary and thus broad interpretation. 463 U.S. at 98. Moreover, the Court noted that Senators
Williams and Javits, floor managers of the Senate debate on the conference report, and
Congressman Dent, floor manager of the House debate, each made a statement that
"stressed the breadth of federal pre-emption." Id. at 99; see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,197
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent); id. at 29,933 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 29,942 (re-
marks of Sen. Javits).
42. 463 U.S. at 98.
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ture of benefit plans and thus clearly related to them.4 3 Accord-
ingly, ERISA preempted the two laws.
The Court's construction of section 514(a) and its statement
that laws relate to an employee benefit plan if they are "con-
nect[ed] with or refer to such a plan," imply that a state law that
has any effect on an employee benefit plan "relates to" it. Yet the
New York laws at issue affected employee benefit plans so directly
that an analysis of how they related to such plans could shed no
light on this very extreme implication. Justice Blackmun, appar-
ently recognizing this, stopped short of embracing the implication.
His opinion for a unanimous Court states:
Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law "relates to" the
plan. Cf. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121
(CA2 1979) .... The present litigation plainly does not present a borderline
question, and we express no views about where it would be appropriate to
draw the line.44
Third party prescription drug legislation does present a "bor-
derline" question. State regulation of third party prescription drug
programs may have an indirect economic effect on employee wel-
fare plans. To the extent that a third party prescription drug pro-
gram does not meet the three basic requirements of third party
prescription drug program legislation discussed earlier,45 compli-
ance with those requirements may result in higher costs to the
third party payor. If the third party payor has insured the drug
benefits, it may seek to pass on the costs in higher premiums to the
employers who fund the plan. If the third party payor is a claims
administrator, employers will bear directly the increased cost of
claims.46
But any increased costs would be minor relative to the entire
funding costs of a given employee welfare plan. Most welfare plans
provide a package of health care benefits to plan participants and
43. Id. at 100.
44. Id. at 100 n.21.
45. See supra note 17.
46. Not only may costs per prescription increase, but indirect costs to administer the
program may rise. For example, the typical third party prescription drug program statute
requires that the third party payor provide precise rules on the cancellation of coverage to
program beneficiaries, see supra note 17, which often means that the third party payor must
notify promptly all participating pharmacies of the cancellation of a particular beneficiary's
coverage. The third party payor may incur some additional expense to comply with that
requirement, which it likely would pass on to employers in the form of higher premiums or
administrative fees. Of course, benefit plans have an interest in making this information
promptly available to avoid disputed claims.
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beneficiaries. Prescription drug benefits are a small part of the
benefits that are included in most plans; hospital and medical care
represent the major portion of the average welfare plan dollar. 7
Thus, the additional amounts that employers will have to pay to
fund a plan because of third party prescription drug program legis-
lation will be inconsequential relative to the total funding require-
ments of a given plan.
Moreover, employers and employees still would be free to in-
clude in a plan any benefits they wish. The minor financial burden,
if any, imposed by such statutes is unlikely to influence the choice
of benefits that an employer provides. This differs from the situa-
tion in Shaw, in which New York required all welfare plans that
provided benefits for nonoccupational disabilities to include preg-
nancy benefits. 8 Similarly, because the statutes do not mandate
the inclusion of a particular benefit, an employer who provides
health benefits to employees residing in several states, only some
of which have third party prescription drug program regulation,
will not be forced to establish multiple plans with different benefit
packages or a single plan whose terms and conditions comport with
the benefit requirements of the most restrictive state.
Thus, third party prescription drug program legislation raises
the type of "borderline" question that Shaw did not consider.
However, the Shaw Court's use of the words "tenuous, remote, or
47. In 1982 only 7% of the average health care dollar went to the purchase of drugs;
42% went to hospital care and 19% to physicians' services. By 1985, the figure had dropped
to 5%. See HCFA Office of Research and Demonstrations, 5 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.,
Spring 1984, at 52 Table 5 [hereinafter cited as HCFR 1984]; Statement of Gerald J. Mos-
singhoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Before the Energy and
Commerce Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, U.S. House of Representatives (July
15, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Mossinghof] (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). Out
of the $84.2 billion expended by private insurance organizations for health care in 1982, only
$2.8 billion, or 3.3%, was attributable to the purchase of drugs and medical sundries.
HEALTH INs. Ass'N OF AM., supra note 26, at 16 Table 5.5.
48. See also Champion Int'l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1984) (state age
discrimination law that required pension plans to provide service credit after age 65 for
work "relates to" employee benefit plans; it limits how plans can structure vesting rules);
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982) (state law requiring
provision of health insurance to employees on workers' compensation "relates to" plans; it
dictates the type of benefit that a plan must provide); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70
(1st Cir. 1977) (state requirement that all issuers of group health insurance provide coverage
for the treatment of mental illnesses "relates to" employee benefit plans; benefit plan that
purchases such group insurance must accept the added coverage), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978).
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peripheral" in footnote 21 provides little functional guidance to re-
solve this question.4"
In Rebaldo v. Cuomo50 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit suggested a functional rule to resolve whether
third party prescription drug program legislation "relates to" an
employee benefit plan. Rebaldo concerned a challenge to a portion
of New York's Public Health Law5l that prescribed rates that hos-
pitals could charge payors for inpatient services. The law estab-
lished one rate of payment for major third party payors such as
Medicare, Medicaid, and Blue Cross and a higher rate for all other
payors. As a result, hospitals could not enter into provider agree-
ments with self-insured employee benefit plans that established re-
imbursement rates that were lower than those prescribed by the
statute.
The challenger in Rebaldo, a representative of a self-insured
employee welfare plan, argued that to the extent this law indirectly
precluded employee benefit plans from securing discount rates
with hospitals, it "relate[d] to" employee benefit plans and there-
fore was preempted. The trial court agreed and invalidated that
part of the law.52 The Second Circuit unanimously reversed.53 As
the Second Circuit construed the term "relate to," New York's
Public Health Law did not "relate to" employee benefit plans and
was not preempted.
The Second Circuit began its analysis by evaluating the gloss
on the general preemption clause made by ERISA section 514(c). 4
Section 514(c)(2) defined the term "State," for preemption pur-
poses, to include "a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality. . . which purports to regulate, directly
49. See supra text accompanying note 44; Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears
Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1983) (same observation as in Shaw).
Indeed, without a principled approach to determine whether a state law's effect is remote or
peripheral, inconsistent results are assured. For example, in Time Ins. Co. v. Department of
Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 391 (Dane County
Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978) (state law required employers to pay pregnancy disability benefits), the
court upheld the same type of law that the Supreme Court later struck down in Shaw on
the ground that the statute was "merely of peripheral concern of [sic] ERISA." Id. at 396
(emphasis added).
50. 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2702 (1985).
51. N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2807-(a)(1) (McKinney 1982).
52. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, No. 83-8707, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1984) (available on
LEXIS).
53. 749 F.2d 133. The opinion was written by Judge Ellsworth Van Graafeiland, who
was joined by Judges Henry Friendly and Jon Newman.
54. Section 514(c) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(c) (West 1985), defines certain terms
as they are used in § 514(a). See supra note 29.
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or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit
plans. ' 55 Accordingly, the court concluded that ERISA did not
preempt every state statute that merely had an effect on employee
benefit plans. Only if the state law "purport[ed] to regulate .. .
the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans" would it be
held to "relate to" such plans and thus be preempted .5 The court
found that footnote 21 of Shaw supported its conclusion but also
believed it to be the common sense result:
This conclusion follows as a matter of common sense from the fact that
ERISA plan members and managers are bound to engage in myriad transac-
tions that Congress never considered when it drafted § 514. A preemption
provision designed to prevent state interference with federal control of
ERISA plans does not require the creation of a fully insulated legal world
that excludes these plans from regulation of any purely local transaction.57
Furthermore, the Second Circuit reasoned that the regulation
of hospital costs was "an exercise of a State's police powers," which
"should not be found to 'relate' to 'the terms and conditions of
employee benefit plans' unless this conclusion is unavoidable. ' 58
The challenger in Rebaldo argued that the New York statute "re-
lated to" employee benefit plans by increasing their costs of doing
business, but the court found that such an effect did not "unavoid-
ably" lead to preemption.59
The court noted that many state laws of general application
affected a plan's cost of doing business, such as state minimum
wage laws, rent control laws, and even bridge and tunnel toll re-
strictions. If ERISA were held to invalidate New York's Public
Health Law, then those other laws also would be invalid to the
extent that the laws affected a plan. Employee benefit plans thus
would be "permitted a charmed existence that never was contem-
plated by Congress." 0 The court concluded that if "a State statute
of general application does not affect the structure, the administra-
tion, or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the mere
fact that [it] has some economic impact on the plan does not re-
55. ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(c)(2) (West 1985) (emphasis added); see
infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
56. 749 F.2d at 137 (quoting ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(c)(2) (West 1985)).
57. Id. at 138.
58. Id. The court devoted considerable space to the genesis of the statute and clearly
intimated that the regulation of hospital rates served the extremely important state interest
of health cost containment. Id. at 135-36. The court implicitly weighed the importance of
the statute in determining whether it was preempted.
59. Id. at 138.
60. Id. at 139.
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quire that the statute be invalidated."'61
The Second Circuit in Rebaldo did not examine in detail the
legislative history of ERISA, nor did it extensively review Supreme
Court preemption doctrine; yet the court's analysis and outcome
are consistent with both. Congress chose to expand ERISA's pre-
emption clause beyond its configuration in earlier drafts because it
believed that if the states were given continued freedom to regu-
late private employee benefit plans employers might be dissuaded
from establishing or maintaining such plans. One of Congress'
overriding concerns in enacting ERISA was its desire to encourage
the growth of a private pension and welfare plan system.2 More-
over, Congress found that benefit plans were increasingly interstate
in scope and operation.6 3 Congress recognized that some benefit
61. Id. When read in light of Shaw, the Rebaldo opinion indicates that a state law that
simply has an incidental economic effect on employee benefit plans does not "relate to"
employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a). The relationship is too tenuous to
violate § 514(a). See Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1984) (mere fact that state
law affects benefit plans by increasing cost of doing business does not, without more, mean
ERISA preempts the law).
62. Indeed, the entire regulatory framework of ERISA attempts to strike a balance
between the often competing concerns of securing workers' expectations of benefits and en-
couraging the development of a private employee benefit system. The House Education &
Labor Committee's Report on H.R. 2, the bill that became ERISA, made this point very
clear:
The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights, but the
committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private retirement
plans. The relative improvements required by this Act have been weighed against the
additional burdens to be placed on the system. While modest cost increases are to be
anticipated when the Act becomes effective, the adverse impact of these increases have
[sic] been minimized. Additionally, all of the provisions in the Act have been analyzed
on the basis of their projected costs in relation to the anticipated benefit to the em-
ployee participant.
The Bill reported by the Committee represents an effort to strike an appropriate
balance between the interests of employers and labor organizations in maintaining flex-
ibility in the design and operation of their pension programs, and the need of the work-
ers for a level of protection which will adequately protect their rights and just expecta-
tions. In adopting this approach, the Committee believes it has designed a bill, which,
like the National Labor Relations Act, the wage-hour laws and other labor standards
laws, brings the workers' interests up to parity with those of employers. This legislation
strikes an appropriate and equitable balance between two opposing schools of
thought--those who advocate complete and stringent control of private pensions and
those who oppose any form of government supervisory or regulatory control.
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9 (1974), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATVE HISTORY,
supra note 41, at 2348, 2356; see also Michigan United Food and Commercial Workers Un-
ions v. Baerwaldt, 572 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("ERISA was carefully devised to
insure that the regulations it imposed. . . would not strangle the growth of [employee bene-
fit] plans."), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985).
63. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West 1985) ("Findings and Declaration of
ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISION
plan regulation in addition to the federally imposed scheme might
be beneficial. However, if the states remained free to regulate in
the benefit plan area outside of specific subject matters regulated
by ERISA, a patchwork of multiple and conflicting state laws
could emerge that would impose substantial additional costs and
administrative burdens on benefit plan sponsors.4 This patchwork
scheme, when added to ERISA's complicated federal regulatory
scheme, might create a potentially formidable disincentive to em-
ployers to establish or maintain plans. Congress decided that this
possibility outweighed the potential benefits of state regulation
and, accordingly, imposed broad preemption to eliminate the po-
tential disincentive. Senator Javits revealed this legislative exercise
during the Senate debate on ERISA's conference report:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law,
but-with one major exception appearing in the House bill-defined the pe-
rimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a
formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of
State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the
door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to
deal with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans
not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the State or
Federal level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emer-
gence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of
uniformity with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain excep-
tions-the displacement of State action in the field of private employee bene-
fit programs."1
As discussed earlier, ERISA section 514(c)(1) defines the term
"State" for preemption purposes."6 Both section 514(c) and the ex-
panded preemption rule were added to ERISA when the bill went
to conference. These additions are not surprising because the por-
tion of the definition of "State" that the Rebaldo court empha-
sized-" 'which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the
Policy").
64. See 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent); id. at 29,933 (remarks of
Sen. Williams); id. at 29,942 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
65. Id. at 29,942. A second impetus behind Congress' expansion of the preemption
clause centered on prepaid legal service plans. In response to the concerns of organized la-
bor, Congress sought to preempt state action with respect to mandated open panels in pre-
paid legal service plans. However, the subject matters substantively regulated by the statute
did not address the open-panel issue; thus, under the earlier drafted preemption language
the states were free to regulate on this subject. Congress intended to take away that power
by enlarging the preemptive reach of the statute with the language "relate to," thereby pre-
cluding direct regulation of the terms and conditions of legal service plans. See id. at 29,933
(remarks of Sen. Williams); Turza & Halloway, supra note 5, at 365.
66. See supra note 29.
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terms and conditions of employee benefit plans' "e_-would have
been unnecessary if section 514(a) had preempted only the more
narrow set of regulations relating to the specific matters addressed
by ERISA. Accordingly, given that Congress added section
514(c)(1) to ERISA as part of its decision to expand ERISA's pre-
emption clause, it is entirely appropriate to view this provision as
reflecting, as the Second Circuit noted, the breadth of state regula-
tion that Congress sought to preempt: regulation, either direct or
indirect, of the "terms and conditions" of employee benefit plans. 8
Congress recognized that the form of regulation that created
the most powerful disincentive to the establishment or mainte-
nance of an employee welfare plan was regulation of its terms and
conditions. This type of state governmental imposition is exactly
what Congress sought to avoid. Nothing in the legislative history of
ERISA indicates that Congress ever considered exempting em-
ployee benefit plans from state regulation of commonplace com-
mercial transactions in which employee benefit plans and other
business entities might engage. Nor is there evidence that Congress
considered preempting state laws that regulated the conduct of
parties who were neither sponsors nor participants in employee
benefit plans merely because the statute had the effect of increas-
ing the cost to operate such plans e.6 These laws do not affect the
terms and conditions of employee benefit plans. The Court in
Rebaldo therefore was correct in asserting that "if ERISA is held
to invalidate every State action that may increase the cost of oper-
ating employee benefit plans, those plans will be permitted a
charmed existence that never was contemplated by Congress. '7 0
Furthermore, by integrating New York's strong interest in
containing health care costs into its preemption calculus, the
Rebaldo court adhered to traditional preemption doctrine. Pre-
67. 749 F.2d at 137.
68. Unfortunately, ERISA's legislative history does not shed light on what Congress
meant by the phrase "terms and conditions." However, one may set out a practical defini-
tion by focusing on the following three basic questions an employer assuredly would ask in
deciding whether to establish an employee benefit plan: (1) What benefits should be pro-
vided? (2) Who should receive the benefits? and (3) How should the benefits be funded?
Thus, a plan's rules regarding what benefits are available, how they are paid, how they ac-
crue, how they are funded, and how a person may qualify to participate in the benefit pro-
gram constitute the basic terms and conditions of employee benefit plans. See infra note
134 and accompanying text.
69. See generally Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA,
1979 DuKE L.J. 383, 391; Turza & Halloway, supra note 5, at 365 (discussion of congres-
sional intent regarding scope of preemption).
70. 749 F.2d at 138-39.
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emption theory recognizes that a state's interest justifying a regu-
lation often determines whether federal law preempts that regula-
tion. If the state regulation constitutes an exercise of the historical
police power of the states, courts should be circumspect before
finding it preempted. Federal law should not displace the regula-
tion unless Congress "unambiguously" manifested that intent.7' As
the Court stated in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters,72 "inflexible application of the [preemption] doctrine
is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial inter-
est in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is
one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal reg-
ulatory scheme. '73
These doctrinal precepts originated in the seminal construc-
tion of the supremacy clause in Gibbons v. Ogden, 4 in which the
Court found that the supremacy clause invalidated only those laws
that "interfere[d]" with or were "contrary" to congressional stat-
utes.75 Notions of federal-state comity and the tenth amendment7"
did not allow the judiciary to "withdraw from the States. . . the
'power to regulate where the activity regulated [is] a merely pe-
ripheral concern' of federal law."'77
The Rebaldo decision suggests a functional approach to deter-
71. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); accord Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1933). As these
cases indicate, the view that state interests are relevant in federal preemption analysis is not
simply a phenomenon of the Burger Court. The present Court, however, has strongly sup-
ported this concept. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389
(1985) ("We . . . must presume that Congress did not intend to pre-empt areas of tradi-
tional state regulation.").
72. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
73. Id. at 302.
74. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
75. Id. at 211; see Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,
317 (1981) (noting that Gibbons provides "the underlying rationale of the preemption doc-
trine"). If, however, Congress has chosen to preempt a field of regulation, that choice itself
is a congressional objective. Thus, even state laws that supplement federal regulation within
the subject areas addressed by Congress interfere with and are contrary to Congress' intent.
See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Campbell v. Hus-
sey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Transit
Comm'n v. United States, 289 U.S. 121 (1933).
76. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
77. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 450 U.S. at 317 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959)).
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mine borderline preemption problems that is consistent with the
Supreme Court's prior statements on preemption generally. If a
state law affects the terms and conditions of employee benefit
plans, it "relates to" such plans and should be preempted unless it
meets one of the exceptions articulated in ERISA section
514(b)(2)(A). s Congress indicated its intent that with regard to
laws that affect the terms and conditions of employee benefit
plans, ERISA's goal of promoting the growth of employee benefit
plans should override state interests. One could even say that those
laws do not present borderline questions.
But if a state law affects employee benefit plans without in-
fringing upon their terms and conditions,79 a court should balance
the state's interest in the regulation against the statute's effect on
employee benefit plans. If the regulation serves an important state
interest and the economic and administrative effect on employee
benefit plans is insignificant, ERISA should not displace the regu-
lation. If the equities are weighted toward a significant economic
effect, preemption is required. 0 The balancing of interests is nec-
78. See supra note 22.
79. The predominant example is a state law that marginally increases the economic
costs to operate the plan. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
80. This analysis is consistent with the approach followed in AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1979), of which the Supreme Court apparently approved in footnote 21 of
Shaw, see supra text accompanying note 44, and Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320
(2d Cir. 1985). Merry was one of a series of cases in which federal courts considered the
interplay between ERISA and the power of state courts to regulate domestic relations. In
Merry the Second Circuit held that ERISA did not preempt state garnishment of a spouse's
pension income to enforce alimony and support orders. See also Savings and Profit Sharing
Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1983); Operating Engineers' Local
428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981) (same facts and holding
as Merry); Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding state court award to
spouse as community property 40% interest in husband's pension payments, and ordering
pension fund to make payments directly to spouse). In Merry the support payments ordered
by the state court "result[ed] in unanticipated increases in pension plan administration
costs." 592 F.2d at 125. But the attendant higher administrative costs did not affect the
terms and conditions of the pension plan. The Second Circuit held that this effect was re-
mote and peripheral and that Congress did not intend to preempt such state action. The
Merry court did not weigh the effect of the state action in a vacuum. Instead, it examined
that effect in light of a state's strong public policy interest in having spouses fulfill their
family obligations. The Second Circuit concluded that the increased pension plan adminis-
tration costs were inconsequential when balanced against the state's overriding interest in
enforcing domestic relations laws. Id.
In Gilbert participants in a severance benefits plan covered by ERISA sought severance
pay, in part based on state wage collection statutes. The Second Circuit conceded that such
laws were an important exercise of traditional police powers, but declined to let it mandate
the preemption analysis. 765 F.2d at 327. The state statute determined the conditions under
which severance benefits would be paid, clearly a term or condition of the plan. The court
recognized that such a law did not present a borderline preemption problem; therefore it
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essary because even borderline legislation may be a disincentive to
the establishment and maintenance of welfare plans. But to pre-
empt any state regulation because it may be a disincentive to the
growth of employee welfare plans accords unwarranted deference
to a congressional objective. Weighing the state's interest provides
a principled method for courts to accommodate statutory objec-
tives without treading on state laws that Congress never intended
to preempt.8 1
When this analysis is applied to state third party prescription
drug program legislation, the conclusion reached is that such legis-
lation should not be displaced. Indeed, these laws present a much
easier case than the laws at issue in Rebaldo. Unlike the New York
Public Health Law, third party prescription drug program regula-
tion does not establish different reimbursement rates for different
payors. Private insurance carriers, Blue Cross organizations, and
claims administrators that act for self-insured plans all pay the
same rate. Thus, the laws do not affect how a welfare plan chooses
to fund drug benefits.
Moreover, the increased cost that would be passed on to wel-
was unnecessary to consider the state interest that the statute served. Id. Only if the statute
affected the plan in "too tenuous or remote ... a manner," i.e., the statute did not affect
plan terms or conditions, would the court consider the importance of the state's interest. Id.
81. Antitrust doctrine supports the principle that state action inconsistent with the
objectives of federal law may be immune from displacement if Congress never clearly in-
tended such action to be preempted. Antitrust laws play an indispensable role in the main-
tenance of a free economy. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348
(1963). Their objective, of course, is to prevent activity that displaces competition. Given
the immense importance of the statute, implied immunities are disfavored, and courts have
construed exemptions strictly. E.g., National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v.
Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 (1981) (implied immunities); Abbott Laboratories v. Portland
Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1, 11 (1976) (exemptions). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has implied an immunity from antitrust laws for state action, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943), and has construed the state action immunity broadly. The Court has
granted immunity to private parties who are restrained from competitive conduct by state
regulation. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980). Moreover, state regulation need not compel the anticompetitive conduct; private ac-
tions may be protected from the antitrust laws even if the state merely authorized them.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985).
Despite the acknowledged importance of antitrust laws in commercial regulation, courts up-
hold these competitive restraints because federalism principles require antitrust goals to
give way to state action if Congress has not indicated unambiguously a contrary result. Id.
at 1729-30. Similarly, although Congress expressly stated in ERISA that all laws relating to
employee benefit plans should be preempted, see supra text accompanying notes 29-30, it
did not indicate unambiguously that state laws which do not regulate the terms and condi-
tions of plans be preempted. Thus, even if those laws are contrary to ERISA's objectives,
federalism principles require that courts weigh the state's interest in deciding whether to
displace them.
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fare plan sponsors as a result of compliance with third party pre-
scription drug program legislation is insignificant relative to the to-
tal annual cost to operate those plans."2 Therefore, it is highly
unlikely that the economic effect would dissuade sponsors from
providing drug benefits or would cause them to cut back on other
benefits. The decisions respecting choice of benefits are unaffected.
Finally, such legislation affects neither the process by which pre-
scription benefits are provided to plan participants nor rules re-
specting eligibility. For example, the legislation does not require
indemnification of consumers rather than direct payment to the
pharmacist. The legislation regulates the relationship between the
third party payor and the pharmacist but not the relationship be-
tween the third party payor and the consumer-participant.8 3
Third party prescription drug program legislation serves a
compelling state interest. Pharmacists provide essential health care
services to the community by filling prescriptions, maintaining pa-
tient profiles, and offering drug counseling. They often review the
propriety of a prescription before dispensing it to a customer. They
also advise customers respecting drug utilization procedures and
offer counseling on the interaction between the prescribed drug
and other prescription medications, as well as the interaction be-
tween prescription medications and over-the-counter medications
and foods.8 These practices are a cost effective form of health care
82. See supra notes 45-48.
83. See Deiches v. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund, 572 F. Supp. 766, 770 (D.N.J.
1983) (state preferential transfer statute did not affect terms and conditions of plan even
though it resulted in plan returning contributions). If a state third party prescription drug
program statute contained requirements beyond those generalized in this article, see supra
note 17, the conclusions expressed above would not change. For example, a statute might
require that the third party payor provide program enrollees with detailed information con-
cerning the extent of their coverage under the program. See Third Party Prescription Pro-
gram Act, New Jersey Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Nos. 793, 1029, 1157 (pro-
posed Jan. 31, 1983) (on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review). This requirement would
constitute a reporting and disclosure regulation and would add to the reporting and disclos-
ure obligations already imposed by ERISA. But in such instances a court simply should find
that this requirement alone "relates to" employee benefit plans and is preempted. The court
should enforce the remainder of the statute. The three primary requirements of third party
prescription drug program legislation, see supra note 17, do not depend on any secondary
requirements that a particular legislature may see fit to add to achieve the statute's purpose.
Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983) (valid portions of a statute are to be pre-
served unless it is evident legislature would not have enacted valid provisions independently
of the invalid ones). Obviously, there might be additional permissible requirements as well.
84. See generally Godfrey, What's Ahead for OTC's? Weigh These 5 Predictions, AM.
DRUGGIST, Apr. 1982, at 94 ("Second only to safe and effective health products, consumer
information is the most important commodity in which [pharmacists] deal."); Dollars and
Sense, supra note 15, at 13-15.
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and frequently reduce the need for more costly physician and hos-
pital visits. 8 s
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[s]tates have a com-
pelling interest in the practice of professions within their bounda-
ries." 8 Implicit in this statement is a recognition that professional
services are essential to the public welfare. Because the practice of
pharmacy is an integral and cost effective component of the public
health care delivery system, it is a calling similar to medicine or
dentistry, in which states have a compelling interest.
This compelling interest raises two regulatory concerns: first,
that citizens receive quality pharmacy services, and second, that all
citizens have access to pharmacy services. In certain rural commu-
nities and inner city areas, the only readily accessible outlet for
health counseling of any sort is the independent pharmacist.8 7 If
third party prescription drug programs continue to go unregulated,
the financial solvency of many independent drugstores might be
jeopardized. As a result, it might be difficult to obtain needed med-
ication and prescription counseling in many rural and inner city
areas.88
Furthermore, independent pharmacists are forced to compen-
sate for the losses from third party prescription drug programs by
charging higher prices to patient-purchasers not enrolled in the
programs.8 9 This cost shifting approach directly affects those pa-
tient-purchasers who lack alternative forms of drug insurance cov-
erage. These patient-purchasers tend to be part-time service or re-
tail trade personnel and the non-Medicaid poor.90 As a result,
these two groups may be priced out of the prescription drug
market.
Legislation regulating third party prescription drug programs
therefore constitutes state action tailored to meet the important
85. A 1982 Ohio State University study demonstrated that counseling by pharmacists
to ensure patient compliance with drug regimens resulted in an acute reduction in further
hospital and medical care. The 33 month study revealed an average savings per person of
$2,856 as a result of regular drug counseling. Cable & Schneider, Experiences with the Com-
pliance Clinic: Assessment of the Effect, CONTEMP. PHARMACY PRACTICE, Winter 1982, at 34-
44; see also Mossinghoff, supra note 47, at 3. As previously indicated, pharmacy services are
also available to a much broader extent than physician services. See supra note 15.
86. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
87. See supra note 15.
88. See Fear and Loathing in Coal Country, NARD J., Jan. 1985, at 57.
89. See supra note 14.
90. Medicaid program enrollees are protected from cost shifting because the govern-
ment, as payor, sets the pharmacists' compensation levels. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395u(b)(3),
1395x(v) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
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state interest of insuring access to health care counseling and pre-
scription drugs for all citizens. It also ensures the continued exis-
tence of a very cost effective form of health care delivery.
The economic effect of state regulation of third party prescrip-
tion drug programs clearly is not sufficiently significant to dictate
the terms and conditions of employee welfare plans. Moreover,
when viewed in light of the compelling state interest in such regu-
lation, that effect is de minimis. Accordingly, courts should find
that such legislation falls outside the preemptive reach of section
514(a).
B. Does State Legislation Regulating Third Party Prescription
Drug Programs Constitute a Law That Regulates Insurance?
Even if third party prescription drug program legislation were
found to "relate to" employee benefit plans, the question still
would remain whether the legislation "regulates insurance" and
thus falls within the exception of section 514(b)(2)(A).91 The Su-
preme Court decision in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v.
Royal Drug Co.,92 in which the Court examined the relationship of
third party prescription drug program agreements to the insurance
industry generally, provides a guideline for the analysis.
The Court in Royal Drug ruled that third party prescription
drug programs were not the "business of insurance" for the pur-
pose of determining whether the programs were exempt from the
antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the "business of insurance" from the anti-
trust laws "to the extent such business is . . .regulated by State
law."'93 The Court stated that third party prescription drug pro-
gram agreements were not the "business of insurance" because
that term contemplated an arrangement that involved the under-
writing and spreading of risk. 4 Prescription program agreements
between pharmacies and insurance companies do not transfer and
spread risk but merely are business arrangements undertaken by
insurance companies to reduce their costsY 5
91. Certain of the third party prescription drug program statutes and proposed legisla-
tion extend beyond the three areas of regulation discussed earlier. See supra note 17. Argua-
bly, these provisions relate to employee benefit plans. See supra note 83. If, however, these
statutes "regulate insurance," they are exempt from preemption in their entirety.
92. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
93. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1012(b) (West 1976).
94. 440 U.S. at 211-12.
95. Id. at 214.
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At first glance, it might appear to be an easy leap from the
Royal Drug analysis to the conclusion that because third party
prescription drug agreements are not the business of insurance for
McCarran-Ferguson Act purposes, state regulation of such agree-
ments would not constitute a "State [law] which regulates insur-
ance""6 under the language of section 514(b)(2)(A). But upon
closer scrutiny such a leap becomes precarious.
First, section 514(b) (2) (A) does not speak of state laws regu-
lating the "business of insurance," but rather, of "any law of any
State which regulates insurance." Congress' use of different lan-
guage in section 514(b)(2)(A) suggests that it contemplated that
the phrase "any law of any State which regulates insurance" had a
different meaning than state regulation of "the business of
insurance."
Moreover, in Royal Drug the Supreme Court defined the term
"business of insurance" narrowly.9 7 Only transactions containing
the traditional elements of an insurance arrangement-risk trans-
feral and spreading-were considered the "business of insurance."
It is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in choosing to use dif-
ferent language in section 514(b)(2)(A), intended that the exemp-
tion provision apply not only to laws that regulate traditional in-
surance transactions but also to laws that regulate arrangements
that insurance companies regularly enter into when they sell and
service an insurance policy. These laws include fee standards for
sales agents and brokers9" and standards of conduct for advertis-
ing.99 Third party prescription drug program agreements fit this
category because they are a common practice by which health ser-
96. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (West 1985).
97. 440 U.S. at 231-33; see Anglin v. Blue Shield, 693 F.2d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 1982).
98. See American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784 (2d
Cir. 1983) (state insurance regulation that established maximum commissions for life insur-
ance salesmen on sales to union-management pension funds was an insurance law within the
meaning of § 514(b)(2)(A)).
99. Courts also have recognized that laws establishing financial and certification re-
quirements for insurance companies, minimum capital and surplus requirements, invest-
ment standards, and character standards for management also are laws that regulate insur-
ance within the meaning of ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A). See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus
Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F.
Supp. 382, 391-92 (D. Kan. 1977). These laws do not even regulate transactions, let alone
transactions involving risk transfer and spreading. Additionally, as with third party pre-
scription drug program legislation, it is doubtful whether these laws even "relate to" em-
ployee benefit plans. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2390
(1985).
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vice benefits insurers meet their service obligations to covered
employees. 100
Royal Drug actually offers a persuasive argument that state
regulation of third party prescription drug programs does consti-
tute state regulation of insurance. In Royal Drug the Supreme
Court focused on what it termed "the secondary purpose" of Mc-
Carran-Ferguson: the exemption from antitrust regulation that
Congress gave to state regulation of the "business of insurance."'' 1
The Court stated in dicta that "[t]he primary purpose of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act was to preserve state regulation of the activi-
ties of insurance companies" from constitutional attack under the
commerce clause. 10 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the
activities of insurance companies were broader than merely the
business of insurance. 0 3 Thus, states are constitutionally free to
regulate the activities of insurance companies, and the scope of
this freedom is broader than merely regulation of traditional insur-
ance transactions; states may regulate all activities in which insur-
ance companies regularly engage Third party prescription drug
program agreements are one such activity.
"[I]nsurance is an evolving institution.' 0 4 The regular prac-
tices and activities of insurance companies often change. It is not
unlikely that when Congress used the language "state regulation of
insurance" in ERISA's exceptions clause, rather than "regulation
of the business of insurance," Congress intended the scope of the
exception to track the scope of a state's constitutional freedom to
regulate the typical activities undertaken by insurance companies
in their capacity as insurers. Congress did not seek to freeze the
concept of insurance regulation into the mold it cast when it
carved out the antitrust exemption with the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.'0 5
100. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 246 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is wrong to argue that
third party prescription drug program statutes are not laws regulating insurance but laws
regulating pharmacies. Although the beneficiaries of such laws are pharmacists, the laws
regulate the conduct of insurance companies, not the conduct of pharmacists. See Metropol-
itan, 105 S. Ct. at 2389-93; see also infra text accompanying notes 115-21.
101. 440 U.S. at 218 n.18. This exemption is found in § 2(b) of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 93.
102. 440 U.S. at 218 n.18 (emphasis added). This primary purpose is reflected in the
language of §§ 1 and 2(a) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012(a) (1982).
103. 440 U.S. at 218 n.18.
104. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959); see also Denenberg,
The Legal Definition of Insurance: Insurance Principles in Practice, 30 J. INs. 319, 322 &
n.15, 327 & n.38, 342 (1963).
105. Although several courts have construed ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) and § 2(b) of Mc-
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The few rays of light that ERISA's legislative history sheds on
the insurance exception are consistent with this interpretation.
Unlike the general preemption rule, the language of the insurance
exception remained constant throughout the consideration of
ERISA and was included among the earliest of the many bills that
led to the passage of ERISA.10 6
The so-called "deemer" clause, 10 7 which limits the insurance
exception, states that no employee benefit plan "shall be deemed
to be an insurance company or other insurer. . . or to be engaged
in the business of insurance . .. for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance
contracts.' ' 0 This language contemplates that a business concern
can act as an insurance company or insurer without being in the
business of insurance. Any other interpretation would deprive the
words of the subsection of independent meaning.1ee Consequently,
in order for the "deemer" clause to limit the insurance exception,
that exception should be read to include not only traditional insur-
ance transactions, that is, the business of insurance, but also state
regulation of common business practices of insurance companies.
The deemer clause appeared much later in the legislative pro-
cess, as part of the version of ERISA that went to conference after
House approval." 0 In conference there was a disagreement among
congressional staff members over whether to retain the provi-
Carran-Ferguson in pari materia, see Rebaldo v. Cuomo, No. 83-8707, slip op. at 18
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1984) (available on LEXIS), rev'd on other grounds, 749 F.2d 133 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2702 (1985); McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F.
Supp. 1162, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1980), these holdings are suspect. The McLaughlin court did so
without analysis. The courts in Rebaldo and Eversole based their rulings on the view that
both provisions served the same policy: state primacy in the regulation of insurance. But the
provision of McCarran-Ferguson at issue in Royal Drug, § 2(b), was not the one that reaf-
firmed that primacy. Section 1 reaffirms that primacy, and as Justice Stewart noted in foot-
note 18 of his majority opinion, § 1 embraces more activities than the term "business of
insurance" as it is used in § 2(b).
106. For example, the insurance clause appeared in its current form in the following
early pension and welfare reform bills: S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a)(2) (1973); H.R. 2,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 114 (1973); S. 2, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 507 (1971); H.R. 1269, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 114 (1971); S. 3589, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1970); H.R. 16462, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. § 18 (1970).
107. See supra note 34.
108. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (West 1985); see supra note
34.
109. See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v.
Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882) (a statute should be construed "to give effect ... to
every clause and word")).
110. The Senate bill that went to conference had no comparable provision.
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sion."' As a result of the conferees' decision to expand the scope of
the general preemption rule, Congress retained the deemer clause.
The rationale was that the clause would prevent states from regu-
lating the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans simply
by denominating the plans as insurers, insurance companies, or
banks or trust companies." 2 This fear would not have been legiti-
mate had the intended scope of the insurance exception been lim-
ited to the narrow McCarran-Ferguson antitrust concept of regula-
tion of the business of insurance.
This view of the insurance saving clause is consistent with the
Supreme Court's recent construction of the clause in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts."s Metropolitan was the
Court's first attempt to construe section 514(b) (2) (A). The issue in
Metropolitan was the propriety of mandated-benefit laws, state
laws that required insurance companies to provide certain types of
benefits in insurance policies."
4
The appellant in Metropolitan advocated a narrow interpreta-
tion of the clause. Metropolitan argued that because the intent of
the law at issue was to expand the availability of mental health
care in Massachusetts, it was not an insurance regulation but "in
111. See SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SENATE VERSION AND THE HOUSE
VERSION OF H.R. 2 TO PROVIDE FOR PENSION REFORM pt. 3, at 32 (Comm. Print 1974).
112. See ACTmTY REPORT OF THE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No.
1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1977) (post legislative history); Comment, ERISA Preemption
and Indirect Regulation of Employee Welfare Plans Through State Insurance Laws, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1536, 1540 (1978) ("deemer" clause "aimed solely at preventing states from
regulating employee welfare plans by calling them insurers and taking advantage of the [in-
surance] exemption").
113. 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
114. The specific law under consideration was a Massachusetts statute that required
mental health care benefits to be provided to each Massachusetts resident insured under a
general health insurance policy. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts conceded that its law
"related to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a) because it dictated to
those welfare plans that funded benefits through insurance policies what forms of coverage
they could provide. The Commonwealth, however, argued that the law was not preempted
because it was a law "which regulates insurance." In 1982 the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court upheld the law against an ERISA preemption challenge, Attorney Gen. v. The
Travelers Ins. Co., 385 Mass. 598, 433 N.E.2d 1223 (1982), but the Supreme Court vacated
that decision and remanded for further consideration in light of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 103 S. Ct. 3563 (1983). On remand, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its earlier ruling. The court interpreted the
purpose of the insurance exception as saving from preemption those insurance laws that did
not conflict with the substantive regulatory provisions of ERISA. Because ERISA's substan-
tive regulation of welfare plans was limited to reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary conduct,
- and did not prescribe the "substantive contents" of plans, the court concluded that the
mandated-benefits law was not preempted. 391 Mass. 730, 463 N.E.2d 548 (1984), aff'd on
other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
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reality a health law that merely operate[d] on insurance contracts
to accomplish its end." '115 Metropolitan sought to limit the insur-
ance exception to "state laws designed to protect the insurance
purchaser from improper or imprudent conduct by the insurance
company. 11 8
The Supreme Court rejected this view. As it had in Shaw, the
Court adopted a literalistic interpretation, using common sense
perceptions about the scope of the statutory language. The simple
and general nature of that language required a broad construc-
tion." 7 The Court noted that the Massachusetts law regulated the
terms of certain insurance policies and that everyday "common-
sense" dictated that a law that regulated insurance policies was a
law "which regulates insurance."" 8 Accordingly, the law fell within
the exception."19
Furthermore, the Court found that mandated-benefit statutes
regulated the "business of insurance" as that term was used in sec-
tion 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and that ERISA's insur-
ance saving clause clearly embraced such laws. Importantly, the
Court also observed that ERISA's insurance saving clause was in
pari materia with the broad "primary concern" of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act as expressed in that Act's sections 1 and 2(a), which
provided states with broad "free[dom] to regulate [the activities
of] insurance companies without fear of Commerce Clause at-
tack." 20 This freedom embraces state regulation of third party
prescription drug program agreements. The Court in Metropolitan
noted that ERISA's "saving clause and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act serve the same federal policy and utilize similar language to
115. Brief for Appellant at 34-35, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.
Ct. 2380 (1985); Reply Brief for Appellant at 3.
116. Brief for Appellant at 34. These buyer protection laws, which the appellant
dubbed the "traditional area ... of state insurance regulation," included minimum capital
and surplus restrictions, investment standard restrictions, and character standards for in-
surance company management. Id. at 34-35.
117. The Court found nothing in the scant legislative history of the insurance saving
clause to require anything other than a construction based on plain meaning. Metropolitan,
105 S. Ct. at 2392.
118. Id. at 2388-89.
119. The Court held that the language of the "deemer" clause supported this plain
meaning construction. The Court reasoned that "[u]nless Congress intended to include laws
regulating insurance contracts within the scope of the insurance saving clause, it would have
been unnecessary for the deemer clause explicitly to exempt such laws from the saving
clause when they are applied directly to benefit plans." Metropolitan, 105 S. Ct. at 2390.
120. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 217-18 & n.18; see also supra text accompanying notes
101-05.
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define what is left to the States." 12 1
Thus, for purposes of ERISA section 514(b)(2)(A), insurance
regulation neither excludes nor is limited to state regulation of the
business of insurance as defined for purposes of the antitrust ex-
emption. If a state law regulates the conduct of insurance compa-
nies with respect to activities they perform in their capacity as in-
surers, the law should be considered one "which regulates
insurance."' 22 This statement is the plain meaning rule that
emerges from Metropolitan. To otherwise narrow the insurance
saving clause would be contrary to a common sense view of the
meaning of the statutory language. 123 State third party prescrip-
tion drug program legislation regulates activities typically and pri-
marily undertaken by insurance companies as part of servicing an
assumed risk. Accordingly, common sense indicates that such legis-
lation "regulates insurance."
State laws that regulate prescription drug programs serving
participants of self-insured welfare plans, however, are not laws
that "regulate insurance." Although third party prescription drug
programs may be a necessary insurance practice when an insurance
company or Blue Cross organization executes a policy to an em-
ployee welfare plan and assumes the risk of the cost to provide
drug benefits, 24 not all welfare plans are funded through insur-
ance. Welfare plans are also self-insured. Typically, in such situa-
tions an insurance company nonetheless will contract with phar-
macists, not t6 meet the obligations it has insured but to fulfill its
duties as an administrator hired by the plan to operate the plan's
drug benefits program. The insurance company is not acting to cut
its risks but functions strictly as a claims processor. Moreover, a
121. 105 S. Ct. at 2392 n.21. The Supreme Court further implied that ERISA § 514(d)
would be contravened if ERISA's insurance saving clause were not read consistently with
the broad power reserved to the states in McCarran-Ferguson. See id. That section, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1144(d), provides in pertinent part that ERISA "shall [not] be construed to alter,
amend, . . impair, or supersede any law of the United States." A narrow reading of the
insurance saving clause would reduce the states' power to regulate insurance companies ex-
pressly granted under federal law and therefore would alter or amend that law.
122. See Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 6 Empl. Ben. Cas. (BNA) 2345 (5th Cir. Sept.
16, 1985) (finding insurance exception saves state law causes of action for nonpayment of
insurance benefits).
123. On the other hand, regulation of activities in which insurance companies and
other entities regularly engage should not be construed as insurance regulation. Insurance
companies often pay rent for office space, but it would be illogical to conclude that state
rental laws regulate insurance, because the vast majority of entities embraced by the scope
of such laws are not insurance companies.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
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self-insured welfare plan itself may administer the drug program
or employ a company that does not sell insurance to do so. Indeed,
a third party program administrator may engage exclusively in
claims processing. Claims processing perhaps is an activity en-
demic to the field of insurance even when the processor has not
insured the risk. But when a party executes a prescription drug
program agreement on that basis, he is not protecting an assumed
risk and therefore is not functioning as an "insurance company or
other insurer.'1 25 State laws that regulate these forms of third
party programs do not regulate the activities of insurance compa-
nies and are not "insurance regulation." Accordingly, the insurance
saving clause of ERISA does not necessarily reach all parties regu-
lated by third party prescription drug program statutes. 26
C. Does the "Deemer" Clause Apply?
If third party prescription drug program legislation does con-
stitute an insurance law for ERISA purposes, the remaining ques-
tion is whether the "deemer" clause applies. If a state law that
"relates to" employee benefit plans regulates insurance within the
meaning of section 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, it is exempted from
preemption. If that state law, however, is so constructed that it
treats an employee benefit plan as, or "deems" it to be, an insur-
ance company, or insurer, or in the business of insurance, then the
insurance law exception does not apply and the law is preempted.
This issue is not complicated. Third party prescription drug
program statutes regulate the activity of the party that contracts
with the pharmacist-provider. Such statutes fall within the insur-
ance saving clause to the extent they apply to programs executed
by insurance companies or Blue Cross organizations in conjunction
with an assumption of risk. Thus, with respect to such programs
the statutes regulate the activity of insurance companies. Em-
ployee welfare plans are not parties to such programs, nor are they
third party beneficiaries. They are affected indirectly and insub-
stantially by such programs. Since such legislation does not regu-
125. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (West 1985) (the "deemer"
clause).
126. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, a court need not even reach the question whether
third party prescription drug program statutes constitute insurance laws, because they do
not "relate to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a). See supra text ac-
companying notes 35-90.
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late employee welfare plans directly, the "deemer" clause should
not apply.127
D. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc.128 is
the only reported case to address whether ERISA preempts third
party prescription drug program statutes. The court found that
ERISA preempted Alabama's Third Party Prescription Program
Act. 2 9 But the decision was poorly reasoned and was wrongly
decided.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (Blue Cross) had en-
tered into third party prescription drug programs with numerous
Alabama pharmacies to provide prescription drug benefits to the
participants and beneficiaries of fifty-one employee welfare
plans.130 The court found that the Blue Cross provider agreements
themselves "clearly [were] part and parcel of ERISA 'employee
benefit plans.' "131 This finding easily led to the conclusion that the
agreements "related to" employee benefit plans.
The Pharmacy Act precludes employers and employees from structuring
employee benefit plans that include third party prescription programs which
call for reimbursement rates that "are less than the usual and customary
rates paid by consumers not covered by a third party plan." Although the Act
directly regulates the agreements and relationships between insurers and
pharmacies, it effectively regulates what employers and employees can and
cannot include in employee benefit plans.. . . Accordingly, the Act "relate[s]
to" these plans and the Act is due to be preempted unless the Act fits within
one of the exemptions listed in § 514.132
127. See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692, 699-700
(7th Cir. 1977); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77-78 (1st Cir. 1977) (insurance
laws-laws directed toward insurance companies-that also indirectly affect employee wel-
fare plans do not violate "deemer" clause), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978); Employees
Ass'n of New Jersey v. New Jersey, 601 F. Supp. 232, 240 (D.N.J. 1985) (law that by its
terms regulates insurers and has "at most indirect effects on the cost of insurance charged
to employers purchasing benefits for employees" does not violate "deemer" clause).
128. 567 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
129. ALA. CODE §§ 34-23-110 to -118 (Supp. 1982). The Act contained the three pri-
mary features of prescription drug program legislation defined supra note 17.
130. Peacock's Apothecary, 567 F. Supp. at 1261-63. Although the opinion is unclear,
apparently Blue Cross did not insure those benefits, but acted only as a claims processor,
thereby suggesting that the plans were self-insured. Id. at 1261. Perhaps this is why the
statute's proponents apparently did not argue that the Alabama Act was an insurance law.
131. Id. at 1267.
132. Id. at 1276 (citation omitted). The defendants did argue that the statute satisfied
the criminal law exception of ERISA § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(4) (West 1985). The
Alabama statute established criminal penalties for violation of its provisions, but the court
properly ruled that the penalty provision did not render the Act a "generally applicable
criminal law." 567 F. Supp. at 1276. As a result, ERISA's preemption exceptions did not
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The court's underlying premise concerning third party pre-
scription drug programs was wrong. To view third party programs
as part of employee welfare benefit plans misconstrues ERISA's
definition of a welfare plan.13' That definition focuses on two
groups, employers or employee organizations and employees and
their beneficiaries, and their relationship with respect to the provi-
sion of certain specified benefits. "[T]he intended benefits, [the
particular] class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and [the]
procedures for receiving benefits" constitute the elements of an
employee welfare plan."" If two outside parties execute a contract
that effectuates the agreed-upon or offered benefits of a welfare
plan, yet does not set forth any plan elements, the contract is sepa-
rate from the plan. It is not a part of the plan's terms and condi-
tions. This conclusion remains unchanged even if an agreement be-
tween an employer and its employees that does detail plan
elements were to refer to such a contract or incorporate it by
reference.
Thus, the court in Peacock's Apothecary, Inc. was wrong to
hold that Blue Cross' provider agreements were part of the fifty-
one benefit plans Blue Cross served. The conclusions that emanate
from the court's decision are wrong. The Peacock decision predates
Metropolitan and Rebaldo and fails to address the true issues in-
volved in the question of the application of ERISA to state laws
regulating third party prescription drug programs.
III. CONCLUSION
After Shaw, it is apparent that not necessarily every law that
has an effect on employee benefit plans "relates to" them and is
generally preempted by ERISA. Third party prescription drug pro-
gram statutes present what Shaw termed a borderline preemption
question. The guidelines suggested in this Article to resolve these
questions demonstrate that such legislation does not violate the
general preemption rule of ERISA section 514(a). Furthermore,
based on Metropolitan, state regulation of third party prescription
drug programs, to the extent they apply to agreements executed by
insurance companies that have assumed an obligation to fund drug
apply and the statute was displaced. See supra note 32.
133. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1); see supra note 30 (reproducing language of
§ 3(1)).
134. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1983). In turn, the specific
details concerning these elements constitute the terms and conditions of the plan. See supra
note 68.
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benefits, also should be upheld on the independent ground that
such laws regulate insurance. The field of insurance is broad, and
the intent of section 514(b)(2), as expressed by its language, was to
preserve the sovereignty of the states to legislate anywhere within
the parameters of that field.
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